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NOTES
LABOR LAW-JURISDICTION-Contractual Interpretation,
Unfair Labor Practices, and Arbitration:
A Proposed Resolution of
Jurisdictional Overlap
In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,1 the Supreme
Court held that the state and federal courts must defer to the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board when
an activity is arguably an unfair labor practice as defined by the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 2 At the same time, section
30l(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) provides
that the courts have jurisdiction in actions alleging violations of collective agreements.3 Two distinct factual settings have emerged in
which these jurisdictional propositions are at odds.
First, the parties to a labor contract may incorporate into their
agreement a provision which parallels an unfair labor practice section of the NLRA. For example, the employer may agree that he
will not discriminate against employees because of their union activity. But without regard to the contractual provision, that discrimination is violative of section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA.4 In such
cases, when the same conduct is an arguable violation of both the
contract and the NLRA, the Supreme Court has permitted the
courts and the Board to exercise concurrent jurisdiction.0
The second possibility for jurisdictional overlap occurs in a
somewhat more complicated factual setting. Certain conduct, such as
I. 359 U .s. 236 (1959).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-58 (1964). As used throughout the remainder of this Note, the
term "unfair labor practice[s]" refers to those actions which fall within the prohibited
activities of section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act as amended.
3. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964), which reads in pertinent part:
.
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce •.• may be brought in
any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without
respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties.
The legislative history of this section clearly indicated that the jurisdiction of the
courts in contractual matters was to be in lieu of Board jurisdiction. Thus, the
original Senate version of the NLRA which made violation of collective agreements
unfair labor practices was explicitly rejected in conference in favor of jurisdiction by
the courts. H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 41-42 (1947).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1964), which reads in pertinent part: "It shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer- • • • by discrimination • • • to !!ncourage or discourage membership in any labor organization • • , ."
5. Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U.S. 195 (1962). See also District 50, United
Mine Workers v. Chris-Craft Corp., 385 F.2d 946 (6th Cir. 1967); Star Expansion Indus.
Corp., 164 N.L.R.B. No. 95, 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. ,I 21,343; Dunau, Contractual
Prohibition of Unfair Labor Practices: Jurisdictional Problems, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 52
(1957).
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an employer's unilateral institution of changes in working conditions, ordinarily constitutes an unfair labor practice. 6 Under the
Garmon doctrine, such conduct is within the jurisdiction of the
NLRB. An employer may argue, however, that his changes in working conditions were sanctioned by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, and that therefore his conduct does not constitute an unfair labor practice. 7 Whether the employer's conduct is
sanctioned by the collective agreement is essentially a matter of
contractual interpretation which must be resolved before an inquiry
into the possible unfair labor practice is begun. However, contractual interpretation was clearly reserved for the courts by section
30l(a). 8
The leading Supreme Court decision in this area of jurisdictional
overlap between the NLRA-enforcement power of the Board and
the contract-enforcement power of the courts is NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corporation. 9 The collective agreement in C & C Plywood
reserved to the employer "the right to pay a premium rate over and
above the contractual classified wage rate to reward any particular
employee for some special fitness, skill, aptitude or the like." 10 Wages
were stipulated as "closed" during the effective period of the contract, and neither party was obligated to bargain collectively on any
matter not specifically referred to in the contract. Shortly after the
agreement was signed, the employer initiated a plan which provided
that all members of the "glue spreaders" crew would receive a
premium rate if specified production standards were met. The Supreme Court held that the assertion of a contractual defense by the
employer did not deprive the Board of jurisdiction to find that the
unilateral pay increases, inaugurated without prior consultation
with the union, constituted a violation of section 8(a)(5) of the
NLRA.11 The Court explicitly rejected the argument that the
6. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
7. The same jurisdictional question arises in the converse situation. An employer
may attempt to make changes in his employees' working conditions which he feels
are sanctioned by the collective agreement. If the union refuses to comply with the
changes, the employer would bring an action in a court under § 30l(a) seeking to
enforce his contractual rights. The union would then move to have the case dismissed
on the ground that what is involved is an unfair labor practice within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Board. As one commentator has amply demonstrated, litigants can
easily "exploit the possibilities of fabricating unfair labor practices to defeat or delay
contract actions." Sovern, Section 301 and the Primary Jurisdiction of the NLRB, 76
HARV. L. REv. 529, 551-52 (1963).
8. See note 3 supra. See also the discussion of the legislative history of § 301 in
NLRB v. Strong, 393 U.S. 357, 360-62 (1969); NLRB v. C &: C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S.
421, 425-28; Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 101 n.9 (1962);
Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1962); Textile Workers Union
v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
9. 385 U.S. 421 (1967).
10. 385 U.S. at 423.
11. 385 U.S. at 427-30.
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Board's resolution of the unfair labor practice charge in this case
was inconsistent with the congressional intent to deprive the Board
of jurisdiction over questions of contractual violation and interpretation.
The Board's interpretation went only so far as was necessary to determine that the union did not agree to give up [its statutory
rights]. Thus, the Board, in necessarily construing a labor agreement to decide this case, has not exceeded the jurisdiction laid out
for it by Congress.12
The Court then accepted the Board's finding that since the collective agreement sanctioned increases "for particular employees," not
for groups of workers, the union had not waived its right to bargain about the employer's plan.
While C b C Plywood may have resolved the question whether
the Board automatically loses jurisdiction upon the assertion of a
contractual defense, the case raises a second and even more significant problem. The courts are not the only fora which resolve questions concerning collective agreements. The great majority of labor
contracts provide that disputes arising over the interpretation or
application of their terms are subject to final and binding arbitration. Thus, the question emerges whether C b C Plywood so expands the Board's jurisdiction that it severely restricts the situations
in which the Board must defer to arbitration,13 or whether the Supreme Court's decision can be interpreted to preserve a substantial
role for the arbitrator in interpreting collective agreements.14
Both Congress and the Supreme Court have previously indicated
their concern with protecting the vitality of the arbitral process. In
section 203(d) of the LMRA, Congress declared that "[f]inal adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the
desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising
12. !185 U.S. at 428.
l!I. The distinction should be noted between deference by the Board to arbitration
-that is, a refusal by the Board to exercise jurisdiction-which is the concern of this
Note, and the Board's honoring of an arbitration award already made. In Spielberg
Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955), the Board held it would abide by an award already
rendered by an arbitrator if "[t]he proceedings appear to have been fair and regular,
all parties had agreed to be bound, and the decision of the arbitration panel is not
clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act." ll2 N.L.R.B. at 1082. See
also Crescent Bed Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 296 (1966); Flintkote Co., 149 NL.R.B. 1561 (1964);
International Harvester Co., 1!18 NL.R.B. 92!1 (1962), affd. sub. nom. Ramsey v.
NLRB, !127 F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, !177 U.S. 100!1 (1964).
14. The Court carefully noted in C b C Plywood that the collective agreement
in question did not contain an arbitration provision. !185 U.S. 421, 426 (1967). The
Court also explicitly distinguished the situation in C b C Plywood from that in Square
D Co. v. NLRB, !132 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1964). !185 U.S. at 426 n.9. In Square D the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that since "the existence of an unfair
labor practice here is dependent upon the resolution of a preliminary dispute involving
only the interpretation of the contract," it would not enforce the Board's award but
would compel the parties to arbitrate the contractural dispute. !132 F.2d at 365-66.
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over . . . the interpretation of an existing collective bargaining
agreement." 115 The famous Steelworkers Trilogy 16 put the Court's
imprimatur on that expression of congressional intent. In those
cases, the Court emphasized that, as a matter of national labor policy,
arbitration was to be preferred to judicial action for resolving disputes alleging contractual violations.
Because the Steelworkers Trilogy dealt with the relationship of
arbitration to the courts rather than to the Board, the .Board has not
felt bound by those decisions. 17 Instead, the Board has looked to
such cases as Mastro Plastics Corporation v. NLRB, 18 which appears
to sanction Board interpretation of collective agreements despite the
presence of an arbitration provision. In addition, the Board has
emphasized section IO(a) of the NLRA which provides that its unfair labor practice jurisdiction "shall not be affected by any other
means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement. . . ." 19 In essence, the Board has concluded
that it has complete discretion to decide whether to defer to arbitration in disputes in which the foundation of an unfair labor practice
charge depends upon a particular construction of the collective
agreement.
Some commentators have felt that the Board's position is supported by the Supreme Court's citation of Mastro Plastics in C & C
Plywood. The C & C Plywood Court cited Mastro Plastics for the
proposition that the Board does have the power to interpret collective agreements, and that it need not defer to the courts.20 Upon
examination, however, it is apparent that the Court's concern in
C & C Plywood was primarily with the delay that would result to the
union if it were forced to take its claim to the courts for a prior
15. 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1964).
16. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel &: Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior &: Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., !163 U.S. 564 (1960).
17. See, e.g., Cloverleaf Div., Adams Dairy Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1410 (1964); C &: S
Indus., Inc., 158 N.L.R.B. 454 (1966); St. Louis Cardage Mills, Div. of American Mfg.
Co., 170 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 1968-1 CCH NLRB Dec. 1J 22,216.
18. 350 U.S. 270 (1956). In Mastro Plastics the collective bargaining agreement contained a general no·strike clause and an arbitration provision. Nonetheless, some
members of the union went out on strike in response to an unfair labor practice
committed by the employer. The Court was faced with the issue of whether the contract waived the union's right to strike in the circumstances of the case. The Court
commented that "[t]he answer turns upon the proper interpretation of the particular
contract before us." 350 U.S. at 279. From statements such as this the implication is
drawn by some commentators that the Board has unlimited power to interpret collective
agreements in the course of an unfair labor practice proceeding. See, e.g., Bond, The
Concurrence Conundrum: The Overlapping Jurisdiction of Arbitration and the Na•
tional Labor Relations Board, 42 S. CAL. L. REv. 4, 32-33 (1968).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1964).
20. 385 U.S. 421, 429-30 (1967).
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interpretation of the contract.21 Nevertheless, when the choice is
between the Board and arbitration, rather than between the Board
and the courts, that concern about delay would be minimal. And
although Mastro Plastics was itself a case in which the Court did
allow the Board to interpret a collective agreement despite a provision for arbitration, it is not at all clear from that opinion that
the issue of whether arbitration should have been employed was
directly raised or considered.
Arbitration affords a number of practical advantages over the
Board's resolution of contract matters. Because of the backlog of
cases which confront the NLRB,22 an arbitrator usually can resolve
a dispute more quickly. In addition, the informal nature of the
proceedings before an arbitrator renders arbitration a less expensive
mode of resolving disputes. Third, an arbitrator's expertise gives him
greater flexibility to tailor his award to reflect the needs of particular
industries or of a particular plant.23 Finally, empirical studies demonstrate that both employers and unions prefer an arbitrator's
resolution of their differences.24 That preference should be honored
unless it is clearly repugnant to some unambiguous statutory command. In view of the apparent inconsistency between sections IO(a)
and 203(d), and in view of the arguable nature of the legal precedent,
the practical advantages of arbitration should tip the balance in
favor of the arbitrator rather than the Board in resolving disputes
which require the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement.
There are three different interpretations of C & C Plywood which
make it possible to preserve a preferred position for arbitration in
the resolution of contractual disputes. The first and most promising
of those interpretations focuses on the aspect of contract coverage.
The collective agreement in C & C Plywood permitted wage increases "for particular employees," yet the employer's plan provided
for increases for an entire group of workers. Thus the labor contract
21. 385 U.S. at 429-30. See also Note, To Board or Not to Board: NLRB v. C if C
Plywood, 14 UCLA L. REv. 692 (1967).
22. See TmR.TY-SECOND ANNUAL R.EPOR.T OF THE NLRB 5-10 (1968).
23. As the Court commented in United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel 8: Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960):
When an arbitrator ••• is commissioned to intereret and apply the collective
bargaining agreement, he is to bring his informed Judgment to bear in order to
reach a fair solution of a problem. This is esP.ecially true when it comes to
formulating remedies. There the need is for flexibility in meeting a wide variety
of situations. The draftsmen may never have thought of what specific remedy
should be awarded to meet a particular contingency.
363 U.S. at 597.
24. See Jones 8: Smith, The Impact of the Emerging Federal Law of Grievance
Arbitration on Judges, Arbitrators, and Parties, 52 VA. L. R.Ev. 831 (1966); Jones
8: Smith, Management and Labor Appraisals and Criticisms of the Arbitration Process:
A Report with Comments, 62 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1115 (1964).
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arguably did not even apply to the dispute. Once the Board had
determined that the dispute was not within the terms of the contract,
no further interpretation of the contract clause itself was necessary.
The employer's plan was simply an unfair labor practice, that is, a
unilateral change in working conditions not sanctioned by the contract. Accordingly, only the statutory rights of the union under the
NLRA were involved; and the enforcement of such rights is granted
to the Board.
That interpretation of the Supreme Court's position is the most
consistent with the central role which should be carved out for the
arbitration of contractual differences. The typical arbitration provision reserves to the arbitrator the job of settling disputes by the
interpretation or application of collective agreements. If the dispute
is encompassed by the arbitration clause, and therefore depends
upon contract interpretation for its resolution, the Board should
defer to the arbitrator. On the other hand, once the Board determines that the dispute is outside the scope of the arbitration
clause, there is no question of usurping the arbitrator's interpretative function by allowing the Board to entertain the dispute as an
unfair labor practice charge. Under this analysis the Board's task
would be limited to a determination of whether the parties have
agreed to arbitrate the dispute-effectively the same determination
which is made by the courts in a suit to compel arbitration. 25 In
fact, in a number of cases, the Board has indicated that its willingness to entertain unfair labor practice charges in the face of an
arbitration provision depends upon its determination that the dispute is outside the scope of the labor contract.26 By such an emphasis
on contractual coverage, the Board preserves the vitality of the
arbitral process.
A second interpretation of C & C Plywood focuses on the particular type of alleged contractual violation. The dispute in C & C Plywood between the union and the employer did not involve a single
isolated employee, but centered instead on the employer's right to
institute unilateral changes in working conditions having a continu25. United Steelworkers v. Warrior &: Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960):
[T]o be consistent with congressional policy in favor of settlement of disputes
by the parties through the machinery of arbitration, the judicial inquiry under
§ 301 must be strictly confined to the question whether the reluctant party did
agree to arbitrate the grievance or did agree to give the arbitrator power to
make the award he made. An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should
not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration
clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.
Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.
363 U.S. at 582-83. See also Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962); John
Wiley &: Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964); Jones, The Name of the Game Is
Decision-Some Reflections on "Arbitrability" and "Authority" in Labor Arbitration,
46 TEXAS L. REv. 865 (1968).
26. C &: S Indus., Inc., 158 NL.R.B. 454 (1966); Cloverleaf Div., Adams Dairy Co.,
147 N.L.R.B. 1410 (1964) (concurring opinion of Member Brown). But see McLean
Trucking Co., 175 N.L.R.B. No. 66, 71 L.R.R.M. 1051 (April 21, 1969).
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ing impact on the work force. The Board has indicated that the type
of contractual violation may be an important factor affecting its jurisdiction. In a number of recent cases, the Board has distinguished
between disputes involving "simple default[s] in a contractual obligation" and disputes which have a "continuing impact on [the] basic
term[s] or condition[s] of employment."27 In the former set of cases,
the NLRB will apparently decline to assert its jurisdiction and will
defer to arbitration. Support for that position can be found in section 8(d) of the Act, which makes the unilateral termination or
modification of a collective agreement that is presently in effect an
unfair labor practice.28 An isolated breach of contract involving a
single employee does not represent a "modification" of the collective
agreement.
While this distinction between types of contractual violations
has the virtue of preserving some role for the arbitrator, it presents
the vice of not preserving a large enough role. All the advantages
of arbitration-speed, savings, and the ability of an arbitrator to
fashion his remedies to the needs of a particular situation29-are
present whether the dispute involves a simple contractual default
or has a continuing impact on the conditions of employment. Moreover, the typical arbitration provision confers upon the arbitrator
power to resolve all disputes arising out of the interpretation or
application of the collective agreement, not merely those which the
Board concludes are of insignificant impact. Due respect for the intention of the parties demands that the arbitrator be given a more
expansive role.
Under the third interpretation of C & C Plywood, jurisdiction to
decide a contractual dispute would be determined by the nature of
the injury caused by the employer's conduct and by the possibility
of remedies for that injury through proceedings other than those
before the Board. In C & C Plywood, the employees themselves were
not monetarily injured. Indeed, the premium pay plan could only
increase their compensation. The substance of the damage caused,
therefore, was a diminution, in the eyes of the employees, of the
union's status as an effective bargaining agent. That type of injury
may have been incapable of rectification by the remedial powers of
the courts. First, a damage remedy could not restore lost union
status, and the intangible nature of the injury may have confronted
the union with an insurmountable problem of proof in demonstrating the extent of its actual damages. Second, an injunctive remedy
27. C & S Indus., Inc., 158 N.L.R.B. 454, 458 (1966). See also W.P. Ihrie & Sons,
Div. of Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 165 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 1J 21,432;
Eaton Yale &: Towne, Inc., 171 N.L.R.B. No. 73, 1968-1 CCH NLRB Dec. ,I 22,489.
28. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964), which reads in pertinent part:
(\V]here there is in effect a collective bargaining contract covering employees
in an industry affecting commerce, the duty to bargain collectively shall also
mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify such contract .•..
29. See text accompanying notes 22-24 supra.
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arguably was prevented by the Norris-LaGuardia Act which prohibits federal courts from issuing injunctions "in a case involving
or growing out of a labor dispute . . . ."30 The only remedy the
courts could offer would be some form of declaratory relief. Therefore, a holding that the union was required to go to the courts
for an interpretation of the collective agreement could produce
only delay,31 for the union would eventually have to proceed before
the Board in order to obtain effective relief.
The NLRB, like the courts, could not give an effective damage
remedy. The Board does, however, have the power, in spite of the
anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,32 to obtain
from the United States courts of appeals "appropriate temporary
relief or restraining order[s]." 33 Consequently, in C & C Plywood,
the Board was uniquely empowered to grant an appropriate remedy
for the employer's unfair labor practice. C & C Plywood thus lends
itself to the interpretation that when the Board is not the only forum
capable of granting effective remedial relief, it is not empowered to
exert its jurisdiction over the contractual controversy. However, the
practice of the NLRB has not conformed to that interpretation; 34
and recently, in NLRB v. Strong,35 the Supreme Court appears to
have approved the Board's position.
The employer in Strong was part of a multi-employer bargaining
unit. After that unit successfully negotiated with the union a col30. 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1964), which reads in pertinent part: "No court of the United
States • • . shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or
permanent injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute ••••"
The Supreme Court has not yet decided whether or not a state court is prohibited from
issuing injunctions in a labor dispute or whether or not a federal district court is re•
quired to dissolve any state court injunction previously issued if the suit is removed
to a federal court. Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, Machinists, 390 U.S. 577 (1968).
31. As the Supreme Court has noted, time is crucially important in obtaining
relief. See, e.g., Amalgated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511,
526 (1955) (dissenting opinion). See also NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers Inc., 388 U.S.
26, 30 n.7 (1967).
32. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1964), which reads in pertinent part:
The Board is empowered ••. to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair
labor practice .•. affecting commerce. This power shall not be affected by any
other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established
by agreement, law, or otherwise . . . .
For applicable Norris-LaGuardia provisions, see note 30 supra.
33. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1964), which reads in pertinent part:
The Board shall have power to petition any court of appeals of the United
States • • . wherein the unfair labor practice in question occurred or wherein
such person resides or transacts business • • • for the enforcement of such order
and for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order ••••
For applicable Norris-LaGuardia provisions, see note 30 supra.
34. In a number of cases, the Board has exercised its jurisdiction even where
its remedy consisted of ordering an employer who breached or repudiated a collective agreement to pay to the employees lost monetary benefits provided for in the
contract-a remedy the courts or an arbitrator is equally competent to grant. Scam
Instrument Corp., 163 N.L.R.B. No. 39, 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. ,r 21,155, enforced,
394 F.2d 884 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 980 (1968); Schill Steel Prod. Inc., 161
NL.R.B. 939 (1966).
35. 393 U.S. 357 (1969).
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Iective agreement which provided for the arbitration of contractual
differences, the employer attempted to withdraw from the unit and
refused to sign the agreement. Previous decisions have held that
failure to sign a collective agreement may constitute an unfair labor
practice under section 8(a)(5) of the Act.36 The employer did not
attempt to deny the 8(a)(5) violation, but he did resist the order of
the Board to pay fringe benefits in accordance with the terms of the
agreement. On certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the Board
had not exceeded its statutorily defined remedial powers when it
ordered the employer both to sign the contract and to "pay to the
appropriate source any fringe benefits provided for in the . . . contract."37 Since, after the contract had been signed, either the courts
or an arbitrator could also have ordered the employer to pay the
fringe benefits, Strong appears to dispose of the notion that C & C
Plywood stands for the proposition that the Board can exercise
jurisdiction over disputes involving contractual interpretation only
when no other forum is capable of rendering effective relief.38
It must be emphasized, however, that although Strong appears
to preclude the third interpretation of C & C Plywood, it does not
undermine the other two suggested interpretations. In Strong, the
employer's refusal to sign the collective agreement and to pay the
fringe benefits did have a continuing impact both on the relationship between the employer and the union and on the affected employees. Therefore, Strong fits into the analysis under which the
Board's defenal to arbitration depends upon its assessment of the
degree of harm caused by the employer's conduct.
More important, however, the basic dispute in Strong was not
a matter of contract interpretation or application. As the Supreme
Court explicitly noted in its opinion, the employer's refusal to sign
the collective agreement may not have been a breach of contract.39 If
the refusal was not a contractual violation, the employer had merely
36. H.J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514 (1941); Gene Hyde, 145 NL.R.B. 1252,
enforced, 339 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1964). The obligation to sign a written contract stems
from the definition of the duty to bargain collectively, embodied in § 8(d) of the
NLRA, which reads in pertinent part:
[T]o bargain collectively [includes] ••• the execution of a written contract in•
corporating any agreement reachea if requested by either party . • • •
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
37. 393 U.S. 357, 358 (1969).
38. In the last paragraph of its opinion in Strong, the Court noted that, although
the refusal to sign the collective agreement may not have been a breach of contract, it
was an unfair labor practice. See text accompanying note 39 infra. The argument can
be made, then, that the action dealt with in Strong could not have been brought in
the courts under § 30l(a), but only before the Board as an unfair labor practice, and
that therefore the Board was the only forum that could grant effective relief. That
argument overlooks the fact that, while the employer's refusal to sign may not have
been a breach of contract, the Board's relief went beyond simply remed}ing the refusal
to sign. Once the employer in Strong was ordered to sign the contract, the Board was
not the only forum that could have given the relief of ordering the employer to pay
fringe benefits under its terms.
39. 393 U.S. at 362.
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committed an unfair labor practice; and the union was relegated to
its statutory rights and remedies. But in order to give complete relief from the statutory violation, the Board also enforced union
rights under the contract. That added relief should not, however,
obscure the fact that the original dispute was not contractual. Consequently, Strong is consistent with the position that when a dispute
does arise out of an effective collective agreement, the Board should
defer to arbitration for a resolution.
Arguably, then, the Supreme Court has yet to resolve a case in
which there is a direct clash between the unfair labor practice
jurisdiction of the Board and the jurisdiction of an arbitrator over
questions of contractual interpretation. It is impossible to say
whether the Court will seek to preserve an expansive role for arbitration by adopting any of the suggested interpretations of its
holding in C & C Plywood. Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit has concluded that the Supreme Court is moving in
the opposite direction-that the major thrust of recent decisions has
been to emphasize, to protect, and to give priority to statutory
rights. 40 If that court's analysis is correct, questions of contractual
interpretation are of only secondary importance. And under that
analysis, if the Supreme Court is presented with the direct clash
between the arbitrator's power to construe collective agreements
and the Board's power to remedy unfair labor practices, it would
apparently favor the Board, at least to the extent of granting concurrent jurisdiction. That result would ignore the preference of both
employers and unions for the arbitration of their contractual differences41 and the advantages that arbitration has over Board construction of collective agreements. 42 As this Note has demonstrated,
C & C Plywood and the other recent decisions of the Supreme Court
do not require such a dissipation of the arbitral process.
40. NLRB v. Huttig Sash & Door Co., 377 F.2d 964 (8th Cir. 1967) wherein the
court concluded:
We detect ••• a desire, and perhaps even a policy, on the part of the Court to
give impetus to the various ways of settling labor disputes; to expedite these
matters; to avoid delay either in the courts or in the arbitration process; to
emphasize and protect, in cases of doubt, and to give priority to, statutorily declared
rights; to regard as no more than secondary any contract interpretation aspect
of what is regarded as basically an unfair labor practice dispute or as merely
related to primary Board function under the Act; to take a broad, and not a
narrow or technical, approach to the Act and to the multiplicity of channels available for resolving disputes; and not to close the door upon Board expertise when
such restraint is clearly not violative of congressional mandate.
377 F.2d at 970-71. For an analysis of Huttig, see Note, Labor Law-Unfair Labor
Practices-Board Jurisdiction When an Arbitration Clause ls Used, 9 B.C. IND. & CoM.
L. REv. 497 (1968). See also Browne, The Court, the NLRB, and Free Collective
Bargaining-A Second Look, 54 A.B.A.J. 560 (1968); Lesnick, Arbitration as a Limit
on the Discretion of Management, Union, and NLRB: The Year's Major Developments, in N.Y.U. EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABoR 7, 22-30 (1966); Wollett,
The Agreement and the National Labor Relations Act: Courts, Arbitrators and the
NLRB-Who Decides What!, 14 LAB. L.J. 1041 (1963).
41. See note 24 supra.
42. See text accompanying notes 22-23 supra.

